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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the implementation of an en-
cryption board in order to provide confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity of data collected at any 
point in a power grid, as a potential solution to the 
Smart Grid cyber security issues. This board consists 
of a Freescale microcontroller which enables the 
connection between a PMU (Phasor Measurement 
Unit) and a ZigBee transmitter. Encryption is done 
using the SHA256, HMAC-SHA256, KDF-SHA256 
and AES256-CBC algorithms. This architecture makes 
reading and transmission of voltage and current pha-
sors, energy consumption, frequency, power, power 
factor and power outages measurements, and sends 
this information in real time to a data concentrator 
where display and subsequent storage are possible. 
Keywords: cyber security, hash function, phasor 
measurement, smart grids, symmetric cryptography 
unit.
RESUMEN
Este artículo muestra la implementación de una 
tarjeta de encriptado con el fin de proporcionar 
confidencialidad, autenticidad e integridad de los 
datos recolectados en cualquier punto de una red 
eléctrica, como posible solución a las dificultades 
que presenta el cibersecurity en las Smart Grid. 
Esta tarjeta está compuesta por un microcontro-
lador Freescale que permite la conexión con una 
PMU (Phasor Meter Unit) y dispositivos ZigBee. 
La encriptación se realiza empleando los algorit-
mos SHA256, HMAC-SHA256, KDF-SHA256 y 
AES256-CBC. Esta arquitectura realiza lectura y 
transmisión de mediciones de los fasores de voltaje 
y corriente, consumo de energía, frecuencia, poten-
cias, factor de potencia e interrupciones de energía 
y los envía a un concentrador de datos en tiempo 
real, donde es posible su visualización y posterior 
almacenamiento.
Palabras clave: ciberseguridad, criptografía si-
métrica, función hash, redes inteligentes unidad 
de medición fasorial. 
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INTRODUCTION
Reliability and security of data collected by elec-
tric meters on the consumer side and the utiliza-
tion of these data for pricing and consumption 
profiles require solutions for data transmission 
between the meter and the energy providers pro-
tecting customer privacy and ensuring accurate 
readings without modification of others.
For this purpose, it is necessary to establish 
a security system fulfilling integrity, authenticity 
and confidentiality requirements in order to pre-
vent data alteration and unauthorized access to 
the network. Breaching channel confidentiality 
allows inferring consumption information reveal-
ing personal habits such as if someone was in a 
place for a particular time. Likewise, measuring 
and pricing process requires a secure transmis-
sion procedure where data integrity and authen-
ticity are certified, since validity of user pricing 
method and power grid state estimation depend 
on it (NIST, 2010). Authors like DAI & YAN (2010), 
Peng, Elkeelany, & Layton, (2010), Seshabhat-
tar, Priyanka, Krier, & Engels (2011), Gangil & 
Rakesh (2013) and Stallings (2011) present solu-
tions including symmetric algorithms and HASH 
functions as a proposal to the Smart Grid security 
issues, fulfilling information confidentiality, au-
thenticity and integrity purposes.
 De Craemer & Deconinck (2010), Fan, et al. 
(2012), Luan, Teng, Chan, & Hwang (2009) and 
Khalifa, Naik, & Nayak (2011) have postulated the 
Zigbee protocol as a potential solution to obtain 
simultaneous measurements in real time from mul-
tiple connected devices similarly to AMR (Auto-
matic Meter Reading) networks; this, given the 
smooth implementation of short-range networks 
with low energy consumption and data transfer 
rates up to 250 Kbits/s. 
This paper shows a possible solution to the 
Smart Grid cyber security issues by means the 
implementation of an encryption board which 
provides confidentiality, authenticity and integ-
rity of data collected anywhere on the power grid. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 de-
scribes the methodology used for the design and 
implementation of the encryption board and its 
role within the reading system, as well as the trans-
mission of data measured by a PMU. In section 3 
the obtained simulation results, the designed HMI 
interface and the implementation of the encryption 
board are presented. Finally, in section 4 conclu-
sions are shown.
METHODOLOGY
Proposed Architecture 
Figure 1 shows the proposed architecture for rea-
ding, transmission and storage of information rela-
ted to the power grid state and energy consumption 
in different points; the proposed system is divided 
in two parts, the data concentrator and the me-
ter; in this case, the meter is composed by a PMU 
and an encryption board. The PMU performs the 
measurements related to the power grid variables, 
and the encryption board captures the information 
from the PMU converting it into confidential in-
formation, performing the integration and authen-
tication by means of a security scheme; wireless 
transmission is made using a Zigbee network with 
star topology where the concentrator has the role 
of network coordinator and each of the meters is 
an end device.
On the meter side the PMU 1133A Power Senti-
nel of company ARBITER SYSTEMS is used, which 
collects the voltage and current phasor, energy 
consumption, frequency, power, power factor and 
power outages measurements. The measured val-
ues  are stored in internal registers, and the MOD-
BUS RTU protocol is used via an RS232 serial 
connection to route them externally.
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Figure 1. Measurement system architecture
Source: Own work.
The encryption board is composed by a Free-
scale microcontroller of ColdFire V1 family, which 
allows the connection to the PMU and the Zig-
Bee transmitter through two asynchronous serial 
modules and the connection to the ATSHA204 
cryptographic keys storage device through the I2C 
(Inter-Integrated Circuit) synchronous serial mod-
ule. The microcontroller software contains subrou-
tines to implement the MODBUS-RTU protocol, 
from the SHA256 (NIST, 2012), HMAC-SHA256 
(NIST, 2008), KDF-SHA256 (NIST, 2011) and 
AES256-CBC (Daernen & Rijrnen, 2002), (NIST, 
2001) algorithms used in four main processes: i) 
Reading and transmission of PMU information, ii) 
data encryption, addition of authenticity and in-
tegrity to the information, iii) verification of in-
formation authenticity and integrity and iv) key 
derivation. 
The concentrator consists of a ZigBee com-
munication module, a user interface designed in 
Labview, and the software including subroutines 
for the SHA256, HMAC-SHA256, KDF-SHA256 
and AES256-CBC algorithms used for the meters 
administration, data validation and information 
display and storage.
Security Scheme 
In the implementation of the security scheme 
the recommendations of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technologies (NIST) and Cyber  Se-
curity (CS) in Smart Grid (SG) (NIST, 2010) were 
taken into account, approving the use of existing 
cryptographic functions and algorithms, as well 
as configurations and parameters to get a better 
performance and an adequate security level. The-
re are three families of cryptographic algorithms 
—HASH functions, symmetric algorithms and as-
ymmetric algorithms; for the three families NIST 
approves only the use of the algorithms listed in 
Easter & Bryson (2012).
Each algorithm can be used for a specific pur-
pose or to fulfill several objectives in the same 
process. Table 1 shows the algorithms used to 
provide confidentiality, integrity or authenticity 
to a communication channel; at the same time, 
they can be used to generate cryptographic keys 
(KDF Key Derivation Function) or distribute them 
(KD - Key Distribution) and in the process of ran-
dom number generation (RNG - Random Number 
Generator).
Table 1. Functions available for each of the families of 
cryptographic algorithms
Function Symmetric Asymmetric HASH
Confidentiality YES YES -
Integrity YES - YES
Authenticity YES YES YES
KDF - - YES
RNG - YES YES
KD YES YES -
Source: (NIST, 2007).
The security scheme proposed in this paper ad-
dresses the need to protect the data confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity by means of symmetric 
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cryptographic algorithms, since the keys for these 
algorithms are smaller than those of an asymmetric 
algorithm with the purpose of obtaining the same 
level of security requiring less time to process infor-
mation. In addition, less resources in a communica-
tion channel are required, since the encrypted text 
has the same size than the plaintext, ensuring that 
all the sent information will be useful, which does 
not occur with asymmetric algorithms, which add 
bits to the encrypted text increasing the size with 
the same useful information (Khurana et al., 2010).
The implemented security system is divided 
in two parts: i) the process of key generation and 
distribution, where only the SHA256 algorithm is 
used and ii) the authenticated encryption scheme 
where the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm is used to 
calculate the MAC (Message Authentication Code) 
and therefore to determine the information integri-
ty and user authenticity, and the AES256 algorithm 
to protect the information confidentiality.
Key generation and distribution scheme 
The proposed security system fulfills the following 
requirements: 
l It does not compromise the security of any 
objective (authenticity, integrity and confiden-
tiality) when one in particular is compromised. 
l It does not compromise the security of any 
node when the security of one in particular is 
compromised. 
To fulfill the first requirement, independent keys 
are used for each of the objectives; the keys used in 
the security system are listed below:
l Symmetric key for authentication kA: Key 
used in the HMAC algorithm to generate the 
HASH code that allows obtaining the message 
authentication code.
l Symmetric key for information encryption ks: 
Key used by AES-256 to protect the information 
confidentiality in the communication channel.
l Master symmetric key km: Key used by the 
KDF algorithm to derivate other keys (kA, ks ).
Figure 2. Key derivation and distribution scheme
Source: Own work.
To simultaneously fulfill both requirements, the 
scheme of figure 2 is implemented, where a differ-
ent key set is used for each of the meters associated 
to the network. The initial master key km is intro-
duced in the concentrator and in the key transpor-
tation device ATSHA204. In each of the meters a 
key set               and       is derived; in the first 
step           is derived by executing the equation (1) 
over the device ATSHA204, where  is the indicator 
of the selected meter, SN is the serial of the ZigBee 
module, MAESTRA is the label indicating that the 
key is derived. In this case, with value 0x00 and 
KDF is defined by equation (2).
           
    (1)
            (2)
To derivate       and        , equations (3) and (4) 
are executed over the microcontroller, where 
AUTENTICACION=0x01 and ENCRIPTACION=0x02. 
(3)
(4)
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Simultaneously, the same process is executed 
over the concentrator; in this way, the concentrator 
and each meter have the same key set. 
Authenticated Encryption Scheme 
The authenticated encryption scheme uses the 
AES-256 and HMAC-SHA256 algorithms together 
to fulfill confidentiality, integrity and authenticity 
objectives. The AES-256 algorithm is used in the 
CBC (Cipher- Block Chaining) configuration where 
each of the encrypted blocks depends on the pre-
vious blocks allowing encrypted text blocks are in-
distinguishable between them.
The HMAC-SHA256 algorithm is a variation of 
the SHA256 algorithm described by equation (5), 
which allows generating a message authentication 
code (MAC) from a HASH function, where ipad is 
0x36 repeated 64 times and opad is 0x5c repeated 
64 times.
  
  (5)
From Katz & Lindell (2007), the EtM (Encrypt 
then MAC) configuration is used, which simulta-
neously utilizes both algorithms, first perform the 
encryption of the plaintext and then the MAC is 
computed protecting directly the encrypted text 
against integrity or authenticity attacks and indi-
rectly the plaintext. 
Figure 3 summarizes the process to perform in or-
der to send the information protecting its confidenti-
ality, integrity and authenticity, and Figure 4 shows 
the process to verify the integrity and authenticity 
and additionally decrypt the received information.
Figure 3. CryptoAutentication Scheme for (A)information transmission and (B) information receiving and validation
Source: Own work.
of Figure 3 is executed, and the information is en-
capsulated in the frame structure provided by the 
Zigbee API operating mode.
Figure 4. Payload structure of Zigbee API frame
Source: Own work
Network architecture based on Zigbee technology
Transmission is done through a Zigbee network 
with star topology, where each network device has 
an associated Zigbee module. In this case, the con-
centrator manages the network and communicates 
with each of the meters. For this reason, the Zigbee 
module is configured as coordinator, and meters 
have a module configured as end device. 
Each time the information is sent from the co-
ordinator to the meter or vice versa, the process 
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and synchronizes date and time, with this the setup 
process finalizes and the periodic sending of infor-
mation starts as requested by the concentrator.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the payload 
field of the API frame, the data field has a size mul-
tiple of 16 bytes given by the AES256 algorithm, 
always encrypted and which sends the frames of fig-
ures 6 and 7; the MAC field is the result of running 
the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm over the data field.
Figure 5. Flowchart for starting the encryption board 
and information transmission
Source: Own work. 
Figure 5 shows the flowchart that a meter fol-
lows when the encryption board is started. In the 
first step the coordinator executes the admission 
process of a new Zigbee device on the network, 
then the derivation of the key set is done in the 
microcontroller and it proceeds to send the request 
for authorization of figure 6, where the result of 
calculate                                    is sent.
When the concentrator receives the request, it 
performs the same calculation with the keys de-
rived inside and compares the result, checking the 
MAC it is verified that the keys generated by the two 
parties are the same without having to send them 
by the communication channel and simultaneously 
the identity of the meter sending the information is 
verified. Once keys and identity are confirmed, the 
confirmation of authorization of figure 7 including 
actual date and time is sent, the meter is authorized 
Figure 6. Types of frames sent from the meter to the 
concentrator
Source: Own work.
Figure 7. Types of frames sent from the concentrator to 
the meter
Source: Own work.
Figure 6 shows the structure of the information 
sent from the meter to the concentrator. This infor-
mation is divided in two types: the first for voltage 
and current phasors measurements, frequency and 
power, which is sent in real time and the second 
for sending energy consumption which is done by 
request from the concentrator. Figure 7 shows the 
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frame structure used for a request from the concen-
trator to each of the meters.
RESULTS
Figure 8. Encryption board
Source: Own work.
The encryption board shown in figure 8 was im-
plemented for reading, transmission and storage of 
information related to the power grid state using a 
ZigBee transmitter. It includes information securi-
ty parameters such as confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity, through the implementation of the 
SHA256, HMAC-SHA256, KDF-SHA256 and AES256-CBC 
algorithms in the microcontroller included in the 
encryption board. Figure 9 (A) presents the measu-
rements of running times achieved by implemen-
ting the AES256 algorithms representing 32 bits 
and SHA256 in the MCF51QE128 Freescale mi-
crocontroller, and figure 9 (B) shows these results 
in Labview under a 32 bit platform.
Figure 9. Runtimes of cryptographic algorithms in (A) 
microcontroller and (B) Labview
Source: Own work.
The system is controlled by the HMI in Figure 
10 developed in Labview, which allows to start 
and stop sending real time data from each me-
ter, to request energy consumption, to request key 
change, to observe measured variables in real time 
and to store historical measurements from each 
meter. Starting the encryption board the authen-
tication and synchronization process starts, which 
is notified in the HMI, successfully completed this 
process it is possible to do the requests of figure 8 
over the chosen meter. 
A simulation using OPNET Modeler was carried 
out in order to estimate the number of meters that 
can be connected to the concentrator and to per-
form transmission of real time simultaneous infor-
mation without losing data, where the following 
parameters were configured:
l Star topology with data transmission only 
from the meter to the network coordinator. 
l Packet size of 512 bits per meter in the ap-
plication layer. 
l Transmission time between packs of 82,16 
ms per meter, which includes the time em-
ployed to read information from the PMU (75,2 
ms) plus delay of the authenticated encryption 
scheme (6,96 ms). These are enough times for 
electric energy management in terms of genera-
tion and consumption.
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Figure 10. HMI (Human Machine Interface)
Source: Own work.
Simulation result is shown in Figure 11 (A), 
where the vertical axis is the time in seconds. It 
takes the meter to access the channel and the hori-
zontal axis presents the number of meters in the 
network; the figure shows that by using simultan-
eously 25 meters, average delays of 90 millisec-
onds are obtained, being greater than the time 
between packs, causing loss of data. Figure 11 (B) 
shows the traffic received by the concentrator and 
channel saturation is identified from 24 meters.
Figure 11. (A) Average access time from the meter to 
the channel, (B) Traffic received by the concentrator in 
the application layer for each of the scenarios in bits/s
Source: Own work.
Each meter is waiting for a request from the con-
centrator to start a real time or energy consump-
tion information transmission after performing the 
authentication and synchronization process. Figure 
12 (A) shows the encapsulated request in a Zigbee 
API frame sent from the concentrator, by imple-
menting the figure 3 process.
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In the first step, the data field is encrypted with 
AES256 under the key ks, then the MAC is calcu-
lated with the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm based on 
the key ka and finally the frame is sent to the me-
ter. When the meter receives the frame, first runs 
the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm to validate the MAC 
and then decrypts the data field with the AES256 
algorithm, the result indicates the start of real time 
information transmission because in the “com-
mand “ field a “ 0x00 “ was received.
Figure 12 (B) shows the measurement per-
formed by one of the meters using a load of 132 W 
required by the concentrator, there the encrypted 
data field and the MAC, encapsulated in the same 
frame structure, are included. After receiving this 
frame, the concentrator validates the source ad-
dress through the MAC, then decrypts the data 
field including the descriptor of frame “0x00” with 
the date and time of data measurement, current 
and voltage phasors, power and frequency.
Figure 12. (A) Request from the concentrator to the meter to start real time measurement, (B) Response from the 
meter 
Source: Own work.
system implemented as last mile solution for secure 
and reliable access to information is the first of its 
kind, because it is made from the client side.
The implemented security scheme fulfills the 
information confidentiality, integrity and authenti-
city requirements using symmetric cryptographic 
algorithms with keys smaller than asymmetric al-
gorithms, providing less time for information pro-
cessing with the same security level. 
The time employed for encryption and trans-
mission of data collected from the PMU is enough 
for electric energy management in terms of genera-
tion and consumption. However, it is not recom-
mended to use encryption when sending voltage 
CONCLUSIONS
A collector-meter communication system was im-
plemented that allows monitoring energy consump-
tion and real time state of the power grid in each of 
the meters associated to the network. The security 
of this system was achieved in two levels, the first 
with the design and implementation of the encryp-
tion board which protects data authenticity, integri-
ty and privacy at the point of measurement in the 
power grid through the PMU, and the second level 
for data transmission integrating the security sys-
tem with security mechanisms that Zigbee techno-
logy incorporates. This combination in the security 
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or frequency references to the inverters for certain 
events because they are greater than half cycle of 
the sine wave.
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